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Abstract 
 
Both in his time, and still now, the name of Descartes has been linked with Pelagianism. Upon close 
investigation, however, the allegations of Pelagianism and the evidence for them offer very slim pickings. 
Whether Descartes was a Pelagian is a theological question; the argument here will be that a consideration of 
Descartes’s claims cited as Pelagian nonetheless promises a better philosophical understanding of his views on 
the will and other, related matters.  
 
After an introduction to Pelagianism (sec.1), the most prominent source nowadays for its connection with 
Descartes is seen to be Arnauld, the master critic of the period, who as a Jansenist was especially sensitive to 
any sign of Pelagianism (sec.2). Historically, however, the more important source was the Dutch theologian 
Revius, whose allegation of it against Descartes ignited a long and widespread controversy (sec.3). Just as 
Pelagianism might be seen as a “topos in which the Dutch anti-Cartesian literature was concentrated,”1 so a 
topos for the Pelagian controversy itself might be the biblical text alluded to by Descartes in the fourth 
Meditation, according to which man is created in the image and likeness of God, most so, according to 
Descartes, with respect to the will (sec.4). Another way to frame the issue, of particular philosophical interest, 
then, is the infinity of the Cartesian will, explored more recently by Grimaldi (sec.5). Another recent 
publication, by Scribano, sets out its origins in a way that shows how complex the Dutch debate really was 
both in terms of partisanship and philosophical relevance (sec.6). The issues raised by the connection of 
Descartes to Pelagianism tend to be orthogonal, breeding confusion; so, at the end below, a brief catalogue of 
the theological views relevant to Descartes’s claims will be given, based on the results of this investigation 
(sec.7).  
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1. Introduction 
 
The connection with Pelagianism is one that Descartes himself disavowed in no uncertain 
terms. In an important, carefully considered letter to Mersenne, written just before the 
publication of his Discourse on the Method, he says that he cannot be accused of 
Pelagianism. Although he discusses doing good, he says, he does so only in the sense of 
moral or natural philosophy, “where no account is taken of grace,” which enters the 
question only in a theological sense—as in the question of Pelagianism.2 Adhering to the 
policy urged upon him by Mersenne himself, Descartes eschews theology generally, but 
especially theological controversy.3 In short, he does not espouse Pelagianism because it 
does not, and cannot arise in his work. 
 
By itself, Descartes’s disavowal of Pelagianism counts for very little. No one in the 
seventeenth would have consciously, openly, and explicitly espoused a view condemned by 
the fifth-century Council of Carthage (418 AD) as a heresy. As with many other such 
heresies, however, exactly what was condemned, and exactly what was meant, were 
sometimes matters of continuing controversy. Typically, the Church simply condemned 
statements extracted more or less verbatim from works taken to be problematic. The fifth 
canon of this Council’s decree gives the gist of what was referred to as Pelagianism: it is the 
view that “the grace of justification is given to us such that we are able to fulfill through 
grace what we are commanded to do by free will [per liberum arbitrium], just as if the grace 
were not given it would not be easy but nonetheless possible for us to fulfill divine 
commands.” As a basis for its position, the Council cites John’s citation of Christ 15:5: 
“without me you can do nothing.” 4 
 
Given the controversy it generated, the most important seventeenth-century text on the will 
is the Augustinus (1640), the posthumous publication of the Bishop of Ypres, Cornelius 
Jansen(ius). This huge text was not the first or even the most original effort in the period to 
deal with a perceived recrudescence of Pelagianism. But it raised the stakes by clearly 
attacking Molinism in these terms with a wealth of Augustinian scholarship. (More on 
Molinism immediately below.) Its reading of such texts as John 15:5 was obvious: God 
does all, at least with respect to salvation, for which grace is necessary and sufficient. Not 
incidentally, five propositions from the Augustinus bearing on the issue of grace were 
famously condemned as heretical, for apparently asserting the opposite heresy of denying 
free will altogether. (The condemnations began in 1653 with the Bull Cum occasione, and 
were repeated into the next century in response to Jansenist resistance.) 
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After an opening history of the Pelagian heresy, Jansenius begins the Augustinus by 
identifying the Pelagian view of human free will [arbitrii libertate], “which sets man above 
all other living things, as lying in the indifference of choosing good or evil.”5 The first 
clause does not by itself distinguish the Pelagian from any Christian view. That is, the 
clause is a non-restrictive one. The second clause is where the action lies. Indifference is a 
multiply ambiguous term in the period. Here it is used in the sense that under the same 
conditions at least two incompatible actions are possible. This was a view with a relevant 
pedigree back at least to Ockham, but which in the period came to be associated with the 
Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535-1600), and indeed with his whole Society, although not all 
Jesuits subscribed to the view. 
 
Pelagianism is no trivial issue, or some dry technical issue on the periphery of a woebegone 
period. On the contrary, it is of a piece with a closely related family of heresies condemned 
under various aliases from the earliest days of the Church into the seventeenth century and 
beyond: from Arianism, to Socinianism, Unitarianism, and beyond. Obviously at stake are 
free will, responsibility, the nature of evil, and other philosophical concepts, but also such 
related theological concepts as grace, original sin, and Revelation. Also implicated is the 
role of the Church and its sacraments, and even the divinity of Christ, the Incarnation, and 
the Redemption. If man can save himself, however that is understood, then the account of 
salvation from transmitted sin by a divine redeemer becomes otiose.  
 
To depict the obvious snares of Pelagianism is not to say, however, that Descartes (even 
with his expressed avoidance of theology 6 ) did not unwittingly, or clandestinely, or 
implicitly support some Pelagian doctrine or other. That is, the seventeenth-century 
allegation of Pelagianism against Descartes is rather like certain attributions in recent times-
- for example, the skepticism malgré lui advanced by Richard Popkin, or the between-the-
lines atheistic materialism claimed by Hiram Caton, or even the humanist deism suggested 
by the late Pope. These allegations might be taken as models for understanding what arose 
in the period with respect to Pelagianism.  
 
2. Natural love of God 
 
Nowadays, the best known allegation of Pelagianism against Descartes in the period came 
from Arnauld. A letter of 18 October 1669 to an unknown recipient deals with a letter 
forwarded to him written by the Cartesian Robert Desgabets. The forwarded letter deals 
with a Cartesian ontological account of the Eucharist, one which Arnauld finds problematic. 
Changing the topic, but not the Cartesian context, he adds: “I also find it very strange that 
this cleric takes Descartes for a man very enlightened in matters of religion, whereas his 
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letters are full of Pelagianism, and aside from what his philosophy had persuaded him of, 
such as the existence of God and the soul’s immortality, all that can be said to his advantage 
is that he always appeared to submit to the Church.” 7 This is the whole of the allegation. 
Arnauld cites no particular letter, and gives no argument or explanation. The comment has 
no context beyond that indicated here.8 Moreover, there is a question of how much credence 
should be given Arnauld on this topic. 
 
The first major controversy in France over the Augustinus erupted between Arnauld and 
Isaac Habert, a theologian at the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, who, beginning at the 
end of 1642 and extending into 1643, preached three sermons against the work. Arnauld 
replied, at length, with an Apologie for Jansenius (1644), followed by a Seconde Apologie 
(1645), which rebutted Habert’s rejoinder, the Defense de la foy de l’Eglise (1644). Nor was 
that the end of it. Indeed, it might be said that this dispute has never ended. At its core was 
the issue of Pelagianism, which had been the core of the Augustinus.  
 
Habert concluded that in Arnauld’s view practically everyone, including the Council of 
Trent (1545-63), was a Pelagian. For he acted as if adding the phrase, “if one wills it,” to the 
claim that men are justified by Christ, makes it Pelagian. That is, according to Arnauld on 
Habert’s reading of him, if salvation is conditional upon our willing it, then we in effect 
save ourselves. The phrase was famously used in the fourth canon of the Council of Trent; 
“the soul moved by grace can resist that grace, if it wills to do so [si velit].” So famously, it 
seems, that Habert does not explicitly cite Trent. Instead, he cites such luminaries as Basil, 
Gregory, Chrysostom, and even Augustine as saying the same thing (or at least its 
contrapositive: men “can be saved if they will it.”)9 One reason he does not cite Trent is that 
the concern at this Council was not with Pelagianism, but with its exact opposite, namely 
the strict predestination expounded by Calvin and Luther, which was read as an outright 
denial of free will altogether and the elimination of any role whatsoever for man in his 
salvation. In the Council condemnation of Calvin and Luther, the fine boundaries of 
Pelagianism, which were not under discussion in any case, would have been only a 
distraction. (Even with the Council’s narrow focus, of course, Jansenism loomed, appearing 
a century later). 
 
The text of Arnauld’s that alleged Descartes’s Pelagianism was first brought to light by Jean 
Laporte, who thought that it was “likely” a letter to Chanut that Arnauld had in mind.10 It 
seems that this French ambassador to Sweden had passed along from Queen Christina 
certain questions about Descartes’s views on love, among other topics. Here the question, as 
reported by Descartes, was “whether the natural light by itself teaches us to love God, and 
whether one can love him by the power of that light alone.”11 Descartes begins his reply 
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with “two strong reasons” for doubt, both based on the difficulty in naturally knowing God 
and therefore of loving him. He is not surprised, he continues, that some philosophers have 
argued just this case, and have identified the Incarnation as the only basis for such love. 
“They say too that those who have a passion for some divinity without knowing about the 
mystery of the Incarnation have not loved the true God, but only some idols to which they 
gave his name.” Even so, he concludes, “I have no doubt at all that we can truly love God 
by the sole power of our nature. I do not assert that this love is meritorious without grace—I 
leave it to the theologians to unravel that—but I make bold to say that with regard to the 
present life it is the most delightful and useful passion possible.” 
Laporte himself was unimpressed by Descartes’s restriction of his claim to non-meritorious 
love. He points out that the issue between Augustine and his Jansenist followers on the one 
hand, and their Pelagian-leaning opponents on the other, was not just whether such love was 
meritorious (that is, capable of bringing about salvation), but even whether it was possible 
at all.12 
 
Now, this statement to Chanut is not an aberration or even an innovation on Descartes’s 
part. Rather, it follows from positions prominently espoused by him at crucial junctures of 
his philosophy. The idea of God is for him a clear and distinct innate idea, not so that we 
comprehend him, but sufficient for us to know him. It is an idea that is perfect, such that 
nothing can be added to subtracted from it without thereby making it the idea of something 
else. In a text that resonates in the letter to Chanut, Descartes strenuously distinguished his 
position from that of Gassendi, who thought that the idea was constructed piecemeal from 
experience. “This is how the ideas of Pandora and of all false Gods are formed by those 
who do not have a correct conception of the true God.”13 Moreover, to know the good is to 
love the good. Just as proper perception of the true constrains assent to it, so proper 
perception of the good constrains us to pursue it. Thus he says in the Discourse that “since 
our will tends to pursue or avoid only what our intellect represents as good or bad, we need 
only to judge well in order to act well.”14 In the letter to Mersenne cited at the outset above, 
Descartes defends this claim by appeal to the “common scholastic doctrine ...that ‘the will 
does not tend towards evil except in so far as it is presented to it by the intellect under some 
aspect of goodness’.” 15 The upshot should be, and is, that we are naturally in a position to 
love God. This is the view expressed in the third Meditation, as a comment on the first of 
his passages that alludes to Genesis 1: 28-29, that he is created in the image and likeness of 
God, insofar as He has left His mark upon him. Self-reflection shows me to be incomplete 
and dependent, he says, yet aspiring to something greater, by which I see that there is 
someone on whom I depend and who contains what I aspire to, “not just indefinitely and 
potentially [as I do], but actually and infinitely.” 16 
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Another text that Arnauld might have had in mind is the so-called letter to Mesland of 9 
February 1645. This text has been interpreted as a commitment on Descartes’s part to a 
libertarian view of freedom, and to that extent, at least, it represents a Pelagian inclination. 
Whether this is a correct interpretation is the subject of a very extensive, on-going literature 
involving questions whose complexity is beyond the resources permitted to an investigation 
of just the Pelagian question.17 Suffice it here that a focus of the question has been the 
following sentence, in which Descartes has been read as saying that even in clear and 
distinct perception of the truth, we can exercise a libertarian freedom of indifference and 
withhold assent: “For it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known 
good, or from holding a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to 
demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing.”18 One wonders why, if Descartes holds a 
libertarian view of freedom, any such proviso was tacked on. This observation does not 
settle the matter, but might sufficiently redress the burden of proof for present purposes. 
 
With the controversy immediately ignited by the publication of the Augustinus, it is not 
surprising that Descartes’s attention should be drawn to Pelagianism, nor that the occasion 
should be allegations of his sharing that view. Partially surviving correspondence indicates 
that Mersenne urged upon him consideration of Augustine’s commentary on the fourteenth 
Psalm, made famous by Anselm: “Only the fool hath said in heart there is no God,” but 
which continues in anti-Pelagian fashion: “They are corrupt, they have done abominable 
works, there is none that doeth good.” Descartes expresses surprise that those intending to 
slander him would resort to such an unlikely pretext, but he then proceeds to enter the realm 
of grace in order to detail his differences from Pelagius. He dismisses Pelagius’s claim that 
“it is possible without grace to do good works and merit eternal life,” pointing out that this 
was condemned by the Church. Second, while God’s existence can be known of by reason 
alone, as all theologians have attested, serving as a preparation for faith, this knowledge 
does not merit salvation. For that, thirdly, belief such as that in Christ is necessary, which 
can only come from grace.19 The correspondence, then, does not support the charge of 
Pelagianism; on the contrary. 
 
3. The Leiden controversy 
 
The charge of Pelagianism against Descartes did not have to await publication of his 
correspondence. It arose a decade earlier, in Holland, and was directed against the fourth 
Meditation. On the face of it, that charge is improbable. Arnauld was a close reader of the 
Meditations; after all, he was one of the Objectors. Moreover, he was in the thick of his 
dispute with Habert, and undoubtedly sensitized to this very issue. Yet nowhere in the 
fourth Meditation, or anywhere else in the work, did Arnauld, who probed Descartes’s 
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views on the natures of God and man, their relation of dependence, and other issues of 
relevance to the Pelagian question, ending with “points that might cause difficulty to 
theologians,” nowhere did he find the least ground to enter an objection on grounds of 
Pelagianism. On the contrary, Arnauld identifies the starting point of Descartes’s 
philosophy, namely his own existence, as “exactly the same principle as that laid down by 
St. Augustine.” 20 Instead, it is the ontological problem of the Eucharist that poses the 
danger.21 
 
Descartes had fled to Holland, spending the greater part of his adult life there in order to 
avoid just this sort of controversy in France. He was involved, first, in a more or less known 
crisis, at the University of Utrecht, but where the philosophical interest to us is largely 
limited to having provided him with a motive, or at least an occasion for publishing his 
Principles of Philosophy.22 It was never definitively resolved, but was petering out when 
another emerged at the University of Leiden, where Descartes had matriculated as a student 
much earlier, and where at this point he had significant friends and supporters, but also 
opponents. As in Utrecht, the details, while colorful, are of limited philosophical interest.23  
 
The picture of the opposition sketched by Descartes’s hagiographer Baillet, from 
Descartes’s correspondence (on which Baillet, alas, largely bases his account) is of a 
desperate coterie of moss-backed reactionaries resorting to calumny and intrigue in an effort 
to resist the arrival of the new philosophy represented by Descartes. He felt that not only his 
views, but also his person were under threat; but he wished to avoid the appearance of 
attacking the university itself that would be conveyed by publishing a rebuttal. So he wrote 
a lengthy letter to the curators of the university complaining of misrepresentation. The 
instance of misrepresentation to which he objected at greatest length, and which is 
indicative of the interpretive ability of his critics, was that in the Meditations he had 
portrayed God as deceiver.24  
 
The crucial fact in the episode is that a series of “disputations” had been conducted wherein 
his philosophy came under attack. In particular, Jacob(us) Revius, a Regent of the 
Statencollege, a faculty of theology and philosophy, and Jacob(us) Trigland(us), a Professor 
of Theology there, attacked him on his method of doubt, the nature of God, and the human 
will. Revius (1586-1658) was a counter-Remonstrant, who, as an opponent of Arminian 
(roughly Molinist) doctrines, would have been antecedently no less opposed than Arnauld to 
Pelagianism, and no less on the qui vive for it. He accused Descartes of Pelagianism on the 
basis of a passage from the fourth Meditation, which follows the claim that his 
understanding is “extremely weak and very finite,” whence he forms “an idea of a 
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supremely great and infinite” understanding belonging to God. Here is the passage, as 
presented in Theo Verbeek’s Descartes and the Dutch: 
 
For the same reason, if I examine the faculties of memory or of imagination or some 
other one, clearly none is not small and limited, whereas the same is in God 
immeasurable. There is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I perceive to be so 
great, that I am not aware of an idea of something greater [nullius maioris]. 
Therefore, it is mainly the will, in virtue of which I understand that I may conceive 
of myself as an image and likeness of God.25 
 
The issue initially turned on the phrase nullius maioris, and the comparison class with 
respect to which Descartes says of his idea of the will that there is none greater: the will as 
greater than what? Descartes reports that this question arose in the disputation.26 For Revius 
seems to have understood the comparison class to be unrestricted: nothing was greater. That 
is, Revius took Descartes to mean that he was aware of nothing greater than his idea of the 
will. Given what Descartes says about the will, Verbeek thinks “it is difficult not to be of 
Revius’s opinion [that Descartes espoused Pelagianism].”27  For “...the heart and core of 
Pelagianism was, [Revius] said, that it attributes to man an excessive freedom, which is 
exactly what Descartes does. All faculties are, according to Descartes, circumspecta, or 
limited, except human freedom, which is immense and incircumspecta, that is, infinite and 
unlimited. Consequently, human freedom is as great as that of God.”28  
 
Indeed, with the syntax ascribed to Descartes by Revius, it hard to see why Descartes is not 
claiming, absurdly, that human freedom itself is as great as God Himself. Any such 
disastrous reading is blocked, however, by the sequel to the passage from the Meditations 
quoted above. Descartes says that his will is no less great than God’s when considered “in 
the essential and strict sense.” But God’s will is “incomparably greater than [his], both in 
virtue of the power that accompany it and make it more firm and efficacious, and also in 
virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number of items.”29 
 
So what, then, is the comparison class for Descartes’s nullius maioris claim? Both 
syntactically and philosophically, the only possible referent, or substantival to which the 
adjective applies, would be the other faculties with which Descartes had been contrasting 
the will, namely the understanding, the memory, and the imagination. And this is just what 
Descartes himself tells the university curators, thereby exploding Revius’s argument. 30 
Indeed, it would have been inexplicable for Descartes to have had any greater referent in 
mind. The context for his claim about the will is an explanation of the possibility of error, 
which requires only that it be of greater extent in what it can affirm than is the intellect in 
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what it clearly and distinctly presents for affirmation, not that it be greater than anything 
else, in any other respect.31  
 
 Revius at least implicitly acknowledged a mistake on his part. For he said that he entered 
what he described as a correction in a later text, which his most recent editor takes to be 
obviously the Methodi cartesianae consideratio theologica of 1648.32 Here is what Revius 
had said in the 23rd Disputation of the previous year: “It is false that we have an idea of our 
free will, and that taken precisely and formally it is greater than the image and likeness of 
God, as he says. This exceeds all Pelagianism, and, with God expelled, sets free will in His 
place.” 33 In the later text, he quotes the fourth Meditation as follows:  
 
It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great 
that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above 
all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and 
likeness of God. For although God’s will is incomparably greater than mine, both in 
virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more firm and 
efficacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number of 
items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will 
in the essential and strict sense [in se formaliter & praecise spectata].34 
 
He then comments: “It is false and more than Pelagian that the idea of freedom, and the 
freedom itself, which in God in virtue of knowledge and object is greater than ours, is 
however, considered in the strict sense, not greater than ours.”35 This correction is twofold. 
No longer is Descartes said to regard something of ours as greater than something about 
God. Secondly, the citation from the fourth Meditation acknowledges Descartes’s 
qualification of the resemblance he asserts between us and God. But the reference problem 
remains unaddressed. 
 
It is in the latest work that he finally addresses the reference problem, as follows: 
 
Let the following be noted: the faculties of knowing, remembering, etc., are 
circumscribed in us, but freedom of the will is uncircumscribed, immense, etc., such 
that none is greater, not even in God, if it is regarded in the essential and strict 
sense, for he does not deny that it is greater in God in virtue of greater knowledge, 
power, and object. But these are nothing other than accidents of freedom, not 
freedom itself. He places this equality of our freedom with the divine in this, that 
neither is determined by an external force. Each of them is therefore mistress of her 
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own actions, and independent of all external influence. This is the very heart and 
soul of Pelagianism....36  
 
With the rectification of the crucial reference, however, the prima facie case for Descartes 
Pelagianism begins to evaporate. No longer is it simply the infinitude of the human will, or 
the even the idea of it, that makes the human will too much like God’s, but some further 
consideration, viz. the lack of determination by any external force. Now, to be sure, 
Descartes here and elsewhere appeals to this feature in his characterization of the human 
will. But nowhere in the fourth Meditation, or anywhere else, does he speak of the divine 
will in such terms. For God’s will consists not in such independence, as Revius calls it, but 
in pure indifference.37 Such indifference in God is His pure power, which according to 
Descartes, we certainly do not possess. 
 
4. The image and likeness of God 
 
What is to be made of this feeble attack? Descartes seems to have made more of it, perhaps 
because of well-founded concern for his personal safety, than did his adversaries. Seeking 
redress, he wrote with his complaints not once, but three times to the University curators, to 
William II of Orange, to the French Ambassador, and to various others, thus extending the 
dispute by providing occasions for further attacks. With Revius, the concern with Descartes 
was initially negligible and expanded only in response to defenses of Descartes, perhaps in 
the letters, but certainly in works by Adriaan Heereboord and Johannes Clauberg. At no 
stage, moreover, was the concern with his alleged Pelagianism paramount. 38  Far more 
problematic was Descartes’s conception of an idea as an image, particularly if the idea of 
God is taken to be an image. Any image of God would violate the second commandment 
and introduce idolatry, the bane of Catholicism according to the Calvinist Reform. But even 
here, the concern rested on interpretive mistakes. For Revius ignored Descartes’s 
qualification that ideas are only like images (tanquam imagines), and the distinction he drew 
between what can be imagined such as the difference between a triangle and a rectangle and 
the unimaginable difference between a chiliagon and a myriagon.39 But even a fixation on 
the threat of idolatry does not explain how Revius could have ignored the obvious reference 
to Genesis 1:28-29 in Descartes’s claim of having been made in the image and likeness of 
God. With its failure to address it, Revius’s attack was bound to be lame. 
 
Nonetheless, references to the biblical text were far from uncommon in the period, and had 
a long and sophisticated history of exegesis. For example, Bernard of Clairvaux, whose 
authority for orthodoxy in the seventeenth century was second only to that of Augustine, 
drew a distinction between the senses of image and likeness, from which he teases out a 
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theology of the will. Man is the image of God insofar as he has freedom from necessity; he 
is the resemblance of God insofar as he has freedom from sin and misery, but this freedom 
was lost with Adam’s sin.40 Gilson points out that Descartes differed from Aquinas and the 
Jesuits of Coimbra in taking the ground for man’s likeness to lie in the will.41 The most 
prominent source for this divergence is identified by Gilson as Bernard, with whom 
Descartes might have been familiar through Mersenne, perhaps from his Quaestiones 
celeberimae in Genesim, the ninth of whose comments sets out the view, explicitly referring 
to Bernard.42 Not incidentally, Bernard also held that free will is a binary notion, such that it 
is possessed entirely or not at all. (Of this, more below.) This indivisibility of the will is to 
be found in Aquinas, 43  but sets Bernard, and Descartes, at odds with the Augustinian 
tradition, which regards the will as varying in degree.44 
 
Nor were Descartes and Bernard alone in grounding the likeness primarily in the will. Denis 
Petau, the Jesuit theologian whose work on the will Mesland urged on Descartes, traced its 
history back to the Church fathers. Petau raises the rarified question of whether it is just 
God or the Trinity to which man bears the relation, which leads him to a discussion of the 
view, held by Caesarius, Chrysostom, John Damascene, and Gregory of Nyssene, that it is 
the will of man, “a power of dominion,” that grounds the relation on his side.45 
 
That he is made in the image and likeness of God, then, is not a mere embellishment 
insinuated by Descartes, a pious veneer applied to soothe the doctors of theology at the 
Sorbonne. For the relation grounds important doctrines of his.  The contrast that he draws in 
the fourth Meditation between his great will and his intellect, “which is extremely slight and 
very finite,” enables him to explain the nature of error, crucial to his theodicy, and thus to 
the Mediations as a whole. Unless God can be insulated from responsibility for our errors, 
there can be no hope ever of achieving certainty about truth. In addition, unless he is made 
by God in His image and likeness, which, as he argued in the third Mediation, includes 
creating in him an idea of Him, there can be no proof of the existence of God, and thus no 
general ground for certainly about truth.  
 
It was in response to objections from Gassendi that Descartes elucidated the nature of the 
sort of likeness asserted in the third Mediation, far more than he ever had occasion to do for 
the sort asserted in the fourth Meditation. We bear the likeness of God, he said in the third 
Meditation, as the work bears the stamp of the craftsman.46 But this analogy leads Descartes 
to weaken the resemblance relation (and thus to undermine any basis for a charge of 
Pelagianism). In response to Mersenne he says that he uses the analogy precisely because 
“the absolute immensity, simplicity and unity of God...has no copy [exemplum] in us....In 
virtue of this we recognize that, of all the attributes which...we assign to God... none belong 
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to God and to ourselves in the same sense.”47 In response to Gassendi’s objection that a 
house does not resemble its builder, Descartes explains that the mark of Apelles lies in the 
inimitable technique [artificium] found in his work, not in any exact likeness. Indeed, 
Alexander need not be made of paint and wood in order for him to resemble his portrait. “It 
is not in the nature of an image to be identical in all respects with the thing of which it is an 
image, but merely to imitate it in some respects.”48 The deeper issue between Gassendi and 
Descartes is the very issue that later most exercised Revius, the nature of ideas and of 
representation, and whether we have an idea of God and of what kind. What is not at issue, 
at least not between Gassendi and Descartes, is a connection between resemblance to the 
divine and Pelagianism.  
 
Grimaldi teases out some interesting things to say on that nature of this resemblance in his 
study “Sur l’infinité de la volonté et la ressemblance de l’homme avec Dieu.” We are in the 
image of God, he proposes, in the way that time is the image of eternity,49 or the way that a 
trace is in the image of the mould, viz. by its lack or absence. (One might think of a figure 
as constituted by its absence in the ground.) The image of God is not so much a “re-
presentation” as an “e-vocation” of Him. In these terms, he continues, “the soul is [for 
Descartes] the image of God in the sense that the indefinitely perfectible is in the image of 
the infinitely perfect.”50  
 
Far from grounding a charge of Pelagianism, the drift in Grimaldi’s account of resemblance 
here is toward a refutation of it. Recall, however, Verbeek’s remark that it is hard not to be 
of Revius’s opinion that insofar as Descartes takes the will to be infinite, he attributes to 
man an excessive freedom, which is the heart and core of Pelagianism. Aside from what has 
been discussed above, Verbeek gives no argument for this conclusion. Instead, he offers two 
references; one of them is to Grimaldi’s study.  
 
5. The infinite will 
 
Although the term ‘Pelagianism’ occurs nowhere in his study, Grimaldi does offer the same 
(mistaken) reading of the fourth Meditation passage found in Revius’s critique; they both 
fail to see the comparison class for Descartes’s expression nullius idea.51 Moreover, he 
interprets the will as conceived by Descartes to be infinite in such terms as to offer strong 
support to the charge of Pelagianism. He realizes that nowhere in the Meditations does 
Descartes call the will infinite, nor anywhere else (except in a letter to Mersenne, to be 
discussed below) unless he qualifies it with an expression such as “to some extent 
[quommodo].” Nonetheless, he begins by saying that “almost all commentators agree that 
Descartes attributed to man an infinite will, and seemingly no one denies it,” and he ends by 
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placing himself among these commentators.52 He asks rhetorically how could Descartes say 
what he does, “unless indeed our will were infinite.”53 What does Descartes say that yields 
this conclusion? Of the statements that Grimaldi cites here, the one that most suggests 
Pelagianism is in a letter to Christina, where in arguing that what produces the greatest and 
most solid contentment in life” is the good use of free will, Descartes has this to say: “Now 
free will is in itself the noblest thing we can have, since it makes us in a way [en quelque 
façon] equal to God and seems [semble] to exempt us from being his subjects.”54 Once 
again, Descartes qualifies the resemblance to God, as well as the exemption from his 
dominion. His point seems to be not to establish our independence from God, but to 
establish our status that we share with God as moral agents, to which our happiness is 
bound.  
 
Such is also the point of a text in the Passions of the Soul, which includes an image-and-
likeness allusion.55 Here Descartes discusses the one good reason we might have for self-
esteem, “namely, the exercise of our free will and the control [l’empire] we have over our 
volitions. For we can reasonably be praised or blamed only for actions that depend upon this 
free will. It renders us in a certain way like God by making us masters of ourselves, 
provided that, through timidity, we do not lose the rights it gives us.”56 That by our freedom 
we should be master of our actions is precisely what Revius had objected to as Pelagian in 
the third Meditation. But here, as in the letter to Christina, the claim is not that we have 
divine freedom, which would, among other things, make us omnipotent, but only that like 
God we are moral agents. None of this argues Pelagianism. 
 
Grimaldi claims a novel argument for his interpretation of the infinity of the will, based on 
the one text in which Descartes does not qualify the term. It occurs in a letter to Mersenne 
of 25 December 1639; here is the whole of the text: 
 
The desire that everyone has to possess every perfection he can conceive of, and 
consequently all the perfections which we believe to be in God, is due to the fact that 
God has given us a will which has no limits. It is principally because of this infinite 
will within us that we can say that we are created in his image.57 
 
Says Grimaldi: “Between what is ‘without limits’ and what is ‘infinite,’ the Cartesian 
vocabulary thus appears to make so little difference that he uses one or the other expression 
as synonyms. If this text authorizes us to establish a semantic equivalence between them, it 
is the infinity of our will that we then find affirmed in the Meditations, when Descartes 
‘experiences it so vague and extended that it is not contained within any limits’.”58 But if 
the terms are equivalent in this way, they can be extended not just to the Meditations, with 
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respect to the will, but elsewhere, with respect to extension, numbers, and other things. And 
if the infinity is enough to ascribe divinity to a thing, or ontological equivalence to that 
thing, then Descartes is faced with something like Spinozistic pantheism. Now, perhaps 
Descartes’s philosophy implies such a view (historically, that was one of its drifts, after all), 
but a stronger case will be required than what he says about the will. Descartes himself had 
a block against a drift toward such pantheism in his hardly unremarked distinction between 
the infinite, a positive notion that applies only to God, and the indefinite, a negative notion 
applied to things perceived to be without limits.59 
 
Henri Gouhier was a great exception to the perceived agreement that Descartes took the will 
to be infinite. He took the pantheistic implications of that interpretation to be a reductio ad 
absurdum of it. “If the word infinite applied to the will slips into the place of the word 
indefinite applied to what we experience in desire and pursuit, we would introduce within us 
a perfection whose presence would lead to that of all others; I would no longer be the image 
of God, but God Himself.”60 This is why, according to Gouhier, Descartes in every other 
text qualifies the likeness that he asserts between the human will and the divine. But why 
accept Gouhier’s reading rather than Grimaldi’s? Because it does not rest, not even in part, 
on an outright misreading of the fourth Meditation; it has independent texts in favor of it; 
and it avoids attributing a heretical view to Descartes—not just of Pelagianism, but worse, 
of pantheism.61 
 
Even granting the biblical warrant, why, then, should Descartes assert the likeness relation 
at all? One respect in which the human will is like the divine is that it is absolute. One has it 
all or not at all. It is, as he says, metaphorically, indivisible. This is why there can be no 
grounds for complaint “that God gave me a will which extends more widely than my 
intellect. For since the will consists simply of one thing which is, as it were, indivisible, it 
seems that its nature rules out the possibility of anything being taken away from it.”62 To 
put it another way, willing is a Rylean success or achievement term. (One never wins a race 
or finds a needle well or badly, but only with complete success; unlike the tasks of running 
a race or looking for a needle.63) There are, however, degrees of freedom, with the lowest 
degree being perfect indifference, when one is pulled by grace or evidence equally in 
opposite directions, and the highest, when one is pulled irresistibly in only one direction. 
Yet will and freedom are, for Descartes, one and the same; to have a will is to be free, and 
conversely. To avoid the obvious difficulty, degrees of freedom must be degrees of obstacle 
to the operation of the will, with evidence or grace inversely varying in this respect with the 
effect of passion, imagination and the senses, which ultimately must be overcome as 
obstacles to our pursuit of the true and the good. Degrees in clarity and distinctness, on the 
other hand, indicate degrees of success in perceiving, which is thus a Rylean task term (even 
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if for Ryle himself perception is a success term, a status that, curiously, he tried to exploit 
against Descartes’s theory of perception). It makes sense to say that we see now through a 
glass darkly, but there is no parallel claim with respect to the will. It makes no sense to say 
that we will only partially. Strength of will, which varies in degree, refers to the ability to 
will at all, its frequency for example, or to the endurance of the willing itself, which occurs 
entirely or not at all.64 
 
6. The deep issue 
 
Scribano is Verbeek’s second reference for his agreement with Revius on Descartes’s 
alleged Pelagianism. This one is altogether more relevant. The charge of Pelagianism not 
only appears explicitly in her magisterial work on teologia razionale nel Seicento, but it also 
does so in the first act, center stage.65 Leading the charge against Descartes, or at least 
beginning it, is Revius, the interpretation of whose position here rests on no elementary 
misinterpretation of Descartes. (The correctness of Revius’s interpretation of Descartes on 
the deepest, most crucial point remains a question, as will be seen.) Moreover, her 
discussion provides an enormous amount of context, in terms of the debate over free will 
and also of the divine will, Socinianism, and the drift toward deism.  
 
Her picture of Revius and the debate he launched is far more balanced than Baillet’s 
derogatory sketch; here, Revius is “a frequent and acute critic of the Cartesian 
philosophy.”66 Still, the immediate impression is that the debate was less between critics of 
Descartes and Descartes himself with his supporters, than between orthodox Calvinists and 
their Remonstrant opponents. That is, the issue is not the interpretation of Descartes’s 
philosophy, still less the truth of it, but the Synod of Dort itself. The brouhaha over 
Descartes’s theory of ideas was not of the philosophical sort marking the dispute between 
Malebranche and Arnauld, for example, which was occasioned by the theological question 
of grace, but rather that theological question itself. For Revius, Descartes was the homo 
Jesuista,67 i.e. a Molinist, i.e. Pelagian, i.e. an Arminian (Remonstrant). 
 
Clearly, what distresses Revius is Descartes’s claim, explicitly asserted in the fourth 
Meditation, that, viewed in itself formally and precisely, God’s will appears no greater than 
his own. For this amounts to something more extreme than Pelagianism. Descartes gives no 
argument for the claim, so Revius constructs what he must take to be Descartes’s implicit 
argument, and then criticizes it as fallacious on Descartes’s own grounds. Here is the 
argument: if two terms of comparison consist in the power of pursuing or fleeing the same 
thing, the one is not greater than the other; but human freedom and divine freedom consist 
in just this; therefore neither is greater than the other. To show the non-sequitur, Revius 
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offers a reductio ad absurdum by pointing to two inferences, having the “same logic,” which 
Descartes rejects, or would certainly reject: if two terms consisted in the power of knowing 
the true and the false, the one would not be greater than the other; but the human intellect 
and the divine intellect consist in just this; therefore....Similarly, if two terms consisted in 
the power of operating outside themselves, one would not be greater than the other; but 
human power and divine power, etc. Now, Descartes clearly rejects the equivalence of 
human intellect and power with divine power and intellect, and does so in the very next 
sentence of the fourth Meditation where he asserts the essential equivalence of the divine 
and human wills. (Revius’s recognition of this rejection is a clear advance over his earlier 
treatment of Descartes.) Therefore, according to Revius, he has no basis for asserting that 
essential equivalence of wills.  
 
In fact, Revius asserts that since the assertion of the latter two equivalences is false, the 
former equivalence must be false as well—which involves him in a fallacious inference 
himself. For all that follows is that there is no basis for asserting the equivalence of the 
divine and human wills, not that the assertion of it is false. But no matter. The failure of 
Descartes’s supposed inference is sufficient for Revius’s purpose, viz. the overthrow of 
Descartes’s perceived Pelagianism, and in any case, Revius has an additional argument 
against the view, also based on what he takes to be an explicit inconsistency in Descartes. 
Here Revius cites Descartes’s explication of the vel potius clause, the clause that Descartes 
attaches to his first definition of the will “or free choice,” cited above, as the power to 
pursue or flee. The clause has drawn a great deal of attention in the literature concerned 
with these issues, with various, radically different interpretations of it.  
 
Suffice it here to say that a prima facie plausible way of interpreting it is as an explanation, 
or a better way of stating (vel potius) what he has just said. The clause would then be 
asserting that what is meant by the power to pursue or flee is that when something is 
proposed by the intellect as something to pursue or flee, we do not feel determined by 
anything external in doing so. Revius ignores this clause; but again, no matter. For the 
explication that Descartes then offers of it, which is cited by Revius, gives the gist: in order 
to be free, I need not be indifferent in choosing one or the other; rather the greater my 
inclination in one direction or the other, because of perception of the true or the good, or 
because of God’s operation in me, the more free is my choice.68 
 
With the second argument it becomes clear that the perceived inconsistency in Descartes is 
between the initial definition of the will and the clarification offered by the vel potius 
clause—which is why some commentators have taken the clause to be not a clarification, 
but a retraction of the first definition. Both the inconsistency and Revius’s objection to 
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Descartes are resolved, however, if the first definition is read in the determinist terms 
suggested by the vel potius clause.  
 
Scribano reports that for orthodox Dutch Calvinists, such as Revius was, the will is blind, 
(presumably needing to be led by the divine hand,) as opposed to the view taken by 
Socinians and Cartesian Remonstrants, who attribute power to sighted man at the expense 
of God (whose hand is no longer needed).69 This is curious, because those such as Locke 
who argued for sighted agency in man held that the will is determined precisely by what is 
seen. Taking Descartes to be a compatibilist in this sense yields the following complex 
situation. Descartes can be read in a way that avoids the charge of Pelagianism and thus that 
supports not only the Calvinist position, but also, despite the misgivings of Arnauld over 
Descartes’s correspondence, the Jansenist position as well.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The investigation above enables a distinction among views that are relevant to theological 
criticism of Descartes’s treatment of the will. Partly because they are intended to capture 
how they were understood only in the period, the characterizations are perforce contentious 
(which is why they are presented here, rather than at the beginning above), but they should 
nonetheless be useful in any discussion of Descartes’s views on the will and their historical 
context. 
 
1. Pelagianism is the view that we are able to save ourselves by natural means, without any 
grace at all. As such, it is not a doctrine about the nature of the will. Conceivably, we could 
be constrained to save ourselves by entirely natural causes, without the help of grace; but 
the natural reading of Pelagianism is with an ancillary view of the will and its freedom in 
libertarian terms. Certainly, it was read in this way by those in the seventeenth century who 
were most sensitive to its perceived recrudescence, particularly in Molinism as perceived by 
the Jansenists.  
 
2. In this context, Calvinism and Lutheranism were views on grace according to which 
grace is necessary and sufficient for salvation, involving some form of strict predestination 
that according to their Catholic opponents, eliminated free will, at least with respect to 
actions relevant to salvation.  
 
3. Jansenism, too, made grace necessary and sufficient, but in way that, according to its 
Catholic proponents, does not eliminate freedom. Indeed, they spoke of freedom as 
compatible with a kind of necessity of action generated by grace.  
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4. Molinism has come to be known primarily as a view about knowledge of future 
conditionals. God has “middle knowledge” of man’s future free actions, between necessary 
truths independent of His will and of contingent truths dependent on His will. But the 
problem generating the view as a solution stems from a libertarian view of human freedom, 
according to which different acts are possible under the same conditions, with no constraint 
whatsoever on which one of them gets done. At this point we have indifference, the essence 
of freedom. This is not to say, however, that there are absolutely no constraints, which 
would amount to omnipotence; our unconstrained choices are limited. One limiting 
constraint is grace, without which we cannot do what must be done in order for us to be 
saved, but which, however, is given to all, including to those who under the same 
circumstances do no make use of it. Thus did its opponents try to connect it with 
Pelagianism: we make the difference that makes the difference between salvation and 
damnation, and so we effectively save ourselves.  
 
5. Finally, Descartes’s view, according to which indifference occurs not when we are 
unconstrained as between alternative possibilities, but when we fully and equally 
constrained as between them. Constraints might be the passions, the senses, the 
imagination, clear and distinct perception of the truth, but also grace. The perceived danger 
of Pelagianism came from those who excessively empowered the will by making its 
freedom consist in unconstrained indifference. Descartes’s account of indifference blocks 
that threat. 
 
In the so-called letter to Mesland, Descartes says that, “‘indifference’ in this context seems 
to me strictly to mean that state of the will when it is not impelled one way rather than 
another by any perception of truth or goodness.”70 This is not to say, however, that one is 
not impelled at all. On the contrary, in the context of the first Meditation, which is an 
important backdrop to this text, he produces “powerful and well thought-out reasons” to 
counterbalance his unfounded former opinions.71 This sense of indifference is the only one 
that Descartes ever employs.72 
 
A text that brings together important strands of Descartes’s view of the will is found in the 
sixth Replies; the strands spring from the core of his metaphysics. Not incidentally, this text 
also explodes the connection with Pelagianism based on the image-and-likeness topos. The 
objection to which Descartes is replying is that by removing indifference (in the Molinist 
sense) from human freedom, he has destroyed divine freedom of indifference, for the 
essence of freedom, being indivisible, must be the same in both. Descartes replies: “As for 
freedom of the will, the way in which it exists in God is quite different [longe alia] from the 
way in which it exists in us. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God was not 
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indifferent from eternity with respect to everything that has happened or will ever 
happen.”73 Descartes then proceeds to expound his creation-of-truth doctrine, remarking 
that “the supreme indifference found in God is the supreme indication of his 
omnipotence....Hence the indifference which belongs to human freedom is very different 
from that which belongs to divine freedom.”   
 
Descartes responds to the objection’s charge by denying that God and man share the same 
essence of freedom. To be sure, will and freedom both in man and in God are identical. But 
freedom in God entails absolute omnipotence, whereas there is no such entailment from 
human freedom. What then is the basis for claim that it is “above all in virtue of the will” 
that he understands himself to bear “the image and likeness of God...[when God’s will is] 
considered as will in the essential and strict sense”?74 He gives the answer in the very next 
sentence: “This is because the will simply consists in our ability to do or not to do 
something....” This generic, binary notion of the will (which, not incidentally, Descartes 
immediately clarifies in an apparently anti-Pelagian fashion) is the mark of the divine 
workman sufficient for His work to be His image and likeness. 
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